The Future ADF Page equipment and numbers reflect a larger Australian population and a larger economy facing periods of destabilisation in the Asia/Pacific region - including in the Indian Ocean.
The equipment suggestions are focused on maximising the warfighting capability of the country rather than fielding reconnaissance orientated or underequipped platforms and personnel. The Armed Forces are tasked with three broad missions:
1. Defending the Australian Mainland against peer opposition,
2. Engaging in Regional Unilateral Air-Sea-Land Operations in defence of Singapore, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, with deployments to nations throughout Oceania and in the wider the Indo-Pacific area,
3. Participation in Multi-National Overseas Engagements anywhere on the globe, whether they be humanitarian* or conflict based, that include the ability to strategically deploy all necessary equipment, personnel and supply logistics.
Future ADF Page does not assume any logistical or direct warfighting assistance from the USA or other allies during a time of conflict.
1. Defending the Australian Mainland - In the primary role of defending the Australian mainland the ADF must be centred on equipment and personnel needed to defeat a potential rogue and radicalised Indonesian Military force that may develop in a 10 to 15 year time frame. The strengthening of the military is contingency planning against a future expansionist/extremist threat from a much larger neighbour (where currently good relations exist).
The opposing force must be assumed to consist of a large army with correspondingly large numbers of commando trained units, special forces and extremist 'suicide' units. Their air and sea assets would consist of modern weapons systems with substantial numbers of Su-35 or better type aircraft (with up to 150 top-of-the-line air superiority fighters).
The invading force scenario would see a covert infiltration of commando units in civilian cargo ships whose objectives are to destroy RAAF aircraft and airfield facilities, to attack and disable naval facilities, including docked ships, to destroy power stations, and to secure logistical resources, including Australian Army facilities, that can be used to partly sustain the landed force. Logistical targets would consist of fuel depots, ammunition depots, plus food and water facilities.
Other objectives undertaken by smaller semi-expendable extremist units could include the destruction of gas and water infrastructure plus the lighting of bushfires during a summer invasion. With the initial landing force tying up Australian resources and damaging air and sea capability, the remaining Indonesian Army units, with heavy equipment, would be landed via fast civilian sea-catamaran transports rerouting troops from wargaming exercises that would provide cover for the attack. During the course of the operation calls would be made by the attackers for the Australian Government to surrender.
It should be pointed out that in certain instances the invading forces may intend genocide of the Australian population. Whilst there may be calls for peaceful surrender the ultimate goal might see a 'Genghis Khan' approach that involves the wholesale killing (or enslavement) of almost everyone on the Australian continent.
In this scenario greater protection of existing military bases will be required to limit the damage wrought by attacking commando units - with larger hostile forces expected in the north and smaller forces in the Southern states. Air and Naval forces must remain effective in order to isolate the invading force via air dominance and sea control - the details of such ADF forces being covered in the Air Force and NAVY page sections.
As a consequence of such a scenario Future ADF Page recommends that the Australian Army be expanded by at least 2 Brigades, each of 4000+ troops, that all Reserve Army Units be significantly strengthened, and there be the introduction of a newly formed 'civilian' National Defence Force. Contingency planning should be made to greatly expand this irregular NDF force in times of conflict - that would be facilitated by an expanded Military Cadets school program that teaches basic weaponry skills to all students. Police forces will also receive training allowing them to co-operate with the military to combat rogue terrorist forces engaged in running street battles in an urban environment. SWAT teams should be given rifle grenade launchers, and have light anti-tank weapons.
2. Engaging in Regional Unilateral Air-Sea-Land Operations - In a volatile future the Australian Defense Force may be called upon to act unilaterally, or act as part of a two nation task force, in the assistance of a foreign Pacific Nation ally. The ADF may be called to act in defence of Singapore, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, or in support of West Papuan Independence - against an expansionist Nationalist/Islamist Nation State threat - with the assumption of no US support. Furthermore small scale military operations throughout Oceania, in the Island Nations of the Indo-Pacific region, should be envisioned.
By addressing the lessons learnt in the Falklands War, one can conceive of the necessary elements needed when projecting power in a worst case scenario in a marine environment (air power, anti-ship missiles, submarines, logistics). Submarine and Anti-Submarine forces will be essential. In any event, with the commissioning of the two Canberra Class amphibious assault ships, more vessels will be required to protect these flat tops whether in low or higher intensity operations. An expanded and strengthened Navy will be needed in the rogue Indonesian war scenario so that the sea lanes can be controlled, and counter strike operations conducted to assist mainland ground forces.
3. Participation in Multi-National Overseas Engagements - Presently the ADF is well placed to perform this role. Additional C-17 aircraft and CH-47 aircraft are recommended to improve overall logistical capability in this regard.
*Humanitarian Operations - The primary peace-time role of the ADF is in humanitarian and logistical support for crisis struck Australian civilians, whether on the mainland or in outlying territories, and to provide assistance to the civilian populations of our near neighbours in times of need. By using air and sea transport assets, genuine goodwill can be built between Australia and the people of our closest neighbours.
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In other respects standard training exercises will continue but with newly introduced snap alerts, large scale mobilisations, heightened Reserve Force exercises, and a NAVY emphasis on ASW and aircraft/missile threats - plus an expanded Army capability in the amphibious, including heliborne, insertion roles. It is important to note that Future ADF Page advocates higher personnel and equipment numbers to take into account a level of attrition during warfighting scenarios.
On a strategic country-to-country level, ties to regional allies, such as Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, the French Navy, and also the Royal Navy, should be strengthened. The level of interoperability and technology sharing with these non-US allies should be increased.
Please note, this site is provided to the reader as a conceptual exercise that places capability over budgets. In reality some components would be scaled back or cut unless defence spending is increased. If spending is limited then the focus must centre on the defence of the mainland - with a strong Air Force and an expanded Army being the priority. The expanded submarine force should also be seen as a priority to control the seas and to act as a delivery platform for land attack missile strikes against opposing command centres and airfield facilities.
Whatever the budget situation, the entire ADF structure must be built firstly around personnel, equipment and logistical necessities, with the administrative side to the equation being not more than absolutely required. For more on these matters consult Air Power Australia's review; Australia's Failing Defence Structure and Management Methodology, for reflective analysis on ADF organisational characteristics.
Ultimately, the motto of this site is: Decide what you want first, then figure out how to get it - dictated on a specific purpose and future war fighting scenarios. Best practice and practical (combat) experience, found in the real world, must be taken into account when making decisions about ADF capabilities. Often small differences in training and/or equipment can win the day.
Thanks for visiting !
(Future ADF Page. Feb 14, 2018)
Future ADF Page will be updated on occasion. [It is presently being updated through 2018] Look out for altered posts and additions to the side column 'Video Links' sections. There is also a cut-down 'budget' version of the suggested equipment that can be found in the side column under the title Immediately Workable ADF Equipment and Structure. Societal and Economic considerations, that are relevant to generating the revenue needed to support the defence force, and maintain personnel levels, can be found at the end of the Army post here. It is also recommended that readers check out this site's 2015 Defence White Paper submission that includes discussion about Defence Procurement strategies.
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